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Insights and Expertise




                                                                They  warn that overly  generous  refund policies could
                       U.S. APP fraud overview                  incentivize carelessness among consumers—or even
                                                                lead to an increase in first-party or friendly fraud, where
          Authorized push payment (APP) fraud occurs when       individuals falsely claim to be victims in order to secure
          individuals or businesses are tricked into authorizing   a refund.
          transfers to scammers, believing the payee is legitimate.
          Unlike unauthorized breaches, APP relies on social    In response, many banks have ramped up their protective
          engineering: impersonation via phone, email or        measures. Multi-factor authentication is increasingly
          messaging platforms. Once funds are sent, recovery is   becoming standard, and there’s been a notable expansion
          rare.                                                 in the use of behavioral analytics, machine learning and
                                                                confirmation of payee (CoP) services to verify recipients
          Following are key data points illustrating the scale, risks   before funds are released.
          and evolving response to APP fraud in the United States:
                                                                These tools undoubtedly strengthen the integrity of
          Escalating losses                                     payments—but they also introduce friction into what has
                                                                become an expectation of seamless, real-time financial
             • -2022 U.S. push-payment fraud losses reached ap-  transactions.
               proximately $2.16 billion, with projections rising to
               $3 billion by 2027 – Atlanta Fed                 Meanwhile, real-time payment providers are facing
             • Losses tied to real-time payments (e.g., Zelle, Fed-  particularly sharp growing pains. Many smaller firms
               Now) are expected to increase from $865 million   and niche PSPs that were previously able to compete
               (2022) to $2.06 billion by 2028 – Payments Dive   on speed and convenience are now struggling with the
             • FBI’s Internet Crime  Report notes roughly  $9 bil-  operational and financial demands of compliance. For
                                                                them, absorbing liability costs or introducing extensive
               lion in U.S. APP losses in 2023, often linked to in-  verification layers can mean lost customers, thinner
               vestment, BEC, and impersonation scams – Atlanta   margins or unsustainable business models.
               Fed
                                                                Opportunity amid disruption
          Fast payments, amplified risks
                                                                So, where does this leave us now? There’s no doubt the
             • -Zelle users disputed over $206 million in scams in   changes have brought greater awareness to APP fraud
               2023—victims covered 80% of losses – Kansas City   and introduced more robust protections for consumers.
               Fed, Market Watch                                However, the new burden placed on providers has exposed
             • Real-time payment systems, while convenient, fa-  weaknesses in real-time infrastructure, challenged
               cilitate irreversible transfers, making scam recov-  traditional business models and opened the door to new
               ery difficult – Atlanta Fed, ACI Worldwide       types of fraud risks.

          Limited liability, rising pressure                    Ultimately, the advancement of APP fraud policy in the
                                                                UK could become a blueprint for other markets. Or it
             • Unlike the UK, U.S. consumers typically aren’t re-  might serve as a cautionary tale on the risks of moving
               imbursed for authorized scams under the Electron-  too far, too fast. What’s certain is that the battle over who
               ic Fund Transfer Act – Atlanta Fed               pays for fraud—and how it can be prevented—has only
             • However, some platforms (e.g., Zelle via Early   just begun.
               Warning Services) are initiating reimbursements
               for imposter scams – Atlanta Fed, Market Watch   Roger Alexander serves as a key adviser to Chargebacks911’s Advisory
             • Enforcement actions: the CFPB sued JPMorgan,     Board and its CEO, Monica Eaton, assisting the company with its expan-
               BofA, and Wells Fargo over $870 million in alleged   sion initiatives, including the highly-anticipated launch of its dispute
               Zelle fraud – Reuters                            resolution solution set to address the record spike of authorized push
                                                                payment (APP) fraud claims. Alexander has previously served in vari-
          Industry response                                     ous leadership roles within the payments and financial services sectors,
                                                                including directorial roles at Barclays and subsequently as the CEO of
             • Financial institutions are deploying stricter verifi-  Switch (the UK’s debit card) and president of Elavon Merchant Services
               cation, multi-factor authentication,  and  AI-driven   Europe. He is currently a strategic advisor for Tarci and Pennies, a major
               monitoring to counter APP threats – ACI World-   UK charity. To learn more, visit: https://chargebacks911.com. Contact
               wide, Payments Dive                              Roger Alexander via LinkedIn at https://www.linkedin.com/in/alexan-
             • NACHA’s upcoming 2026 ACH fraud rules will re-   derroger/
               quire both ODFIs and RDFIs to monitor and poten-
               tially delay suspicious transactions


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